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THE JOINED DESTINY OF MIGRATION 
AND EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP
abstract
In this paper I try to unpack the nest of issues that recent waves of migrations bring to the floor and show 
how immigration plays a crucial role in the making or unmaking democratic citizenship in post-national 
Europe. Although recurrent terrorist attacks make harder and harder for many opinion-makers and 
ordinary citizens to associate immigration with positive opportunity for European citizenship, the paper 
argues that the right to free movement and of emigration is embedded in the nucleus of principles and 
ideals that makes for European citizenship since the Treaty of Rome.  Subsequently, the paper introduces 
the category of statelessness and uses it to tackle the problem of the legal and political evolution 
furthered by the practice of rights within the horizon that is defined by the ideal of a European post-
national citizenship. Refugees and immigrants are interpreted as a challenge and an opportunity in the 
spirit of Hannah Arendt’s intuition that citizenship brings to the floor an unsolvable paradox between 
the human and the political. The conclusion of the paper argues that stateless people—the migrants—
personify this paradox as they can be the locus of a new political practice that signals an incipient form 
of citizenship, truly disconnected from the nation as the European citizenship aspires to be. The denial of 
many civil and political rights to undocumented immigrants and the detention of thousands of migrants 
in the camps located at the peripheries of Europe contrast radically with the community of rights that 
Europe has sought to be since its inception. 
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The process of European unification has opened up important possibilities for innovation 
in the domain of citizenship. Political theorists and jurists have spoken profusely of a 
supranational and post-national paradigm of political freedom that would disentangle 
citizenship from nationality, a revolution no less radical than that of 1789, when “the conquest 
of the State by the nation” started and “the State was partly transformed from an instrument 
of the law into an instrument of the nation” (Arendt 1950, p. 230).
The political history of modern Europe shows that whereas the formation of the territorial 
State unified and equalized subjects under one sovereign law, it was national sovereignty 
that made possible the construction of democratic citizenship in Europe (Brubaker 1992). 
The two in pairings of “subjecthood” and “citizenship” and of “stateness” and “nationality” 
are embodied in this history and preside over the relationship between European citizenship 
and migration. This historical process started with the French Revolution and was perfected 
in reaction against Napoleon’s subsequent expansionism. It acquired the characteristic of 
a twofold movement as national dismemberment of imperial orders and revolutionary call 
for self-determination and political liberty (Soysal 1994). The individual and the nation 
emerged as the two European agents of political legitimacy at the domestic level and became 
the symbols of political and moral resistance against all forms of continental domination, 
whether in Immanuel Kant’s 1795 warning against a “despotism without soul” or in Benjamin 
Constant’s 1814 dissection of illiberal and belligerent imperialism. The nineteenth century 
struggle for national self-determination was part of this legacy, theorized by Giuseppe Mazzini 
as means to human progress and political emancipation and a necessary step toward a global 
brotherhood under “the Law of Peoples”.1 The European Union is the latest chapter in this 
continental political history, which is national and cosmopolitan at once.2 
This is the ideal context of the construction of European citizenship as “the extension of 
citizenship beyond the State as a matter of legal reality” and a challenge to the privileged link 
between “nationhood” and “citizenship” upon which democracy developed (Preuss 1998a, 
p. 139). The challenge is not actually to “state-ness” per se but to “nation-stateness” (Preuss 
1  This is Mazzini’s own expression to designate a global assembly of democratic nations; see Urbinati 2008, ch.1.
2  Hence Jürgen Habermas recently tried “to develop a convincing new narrative from the perspective of a 
constitutionalization of international law which follows Kant in pointing far beyond the status quo to a future 
cosmopolitan rule of law: the European Union can be understood as an important stage along the route to a politically 
constituted would society” (Habermas 2012, pp. 1-2). See also Seyla Benhabib 2006.
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et al. 2003, p. 4). European citizenship decouples the two paradigms that marked the history 
of modern citizenship, “subjecthood” (stateness) and “nationhood” (Preuss 1998b, p. 318). 
“Thus European citizenship can be regarded as a step towards a new concept of politics inside 
and simultaneously beyond the framework of the traditional notion of politics defined by the 
nation-State” (Preuss 1998a, p. 148). Hence, the dialectic between European citizenship and 
migration has great momentum and shows how their destinies are unavoidably intertwined 
insofar as the way to deal with the latter will have unavoidable implications for the meaning 
of the former. The twin destinies of European citizenship and migration come from this: given 
that ius soli is a congenial principle for stateness and ius sanguinis is a congenial principle for 
nationhood, the construction of a supranational level of legal identity questions the latter and 
exalts the former. 
Migration intervenes in the interstices between stateness and nationhood and can provoke 
political decisions that can lead either toward a progression or toward a setback of European 
citizenship. There are reasons to be pessimistic about which of the two trajectories we will 
face, since in recent years, nation-States have become protagonists again, bilateral diplomacies 
have gained the upper hand, frontiers have become less opened to refugees, skirmishes over 
certificates and repatriations go on unceasingly, and the identification of immigration with 
illegality is now rooted in the minds of the general public and national governments. The 
issue of immigration becomes fatally more concerned with border security and the protection 
of the European member States and less with inclusion and integration, of rule of law and 
justice. The economic crisis and the trade-off between costs and rights it justifies had the 
effect of furthering the nationalistic paradigm as the change from Mare Nostrum policy to 
Frontex operation Triton policy proves. In the face of debarkations of refugees from all over 
the world and the growth of an immigrant population, the EU seems to be less willing to be the 
laboratory of a new supranational citizenship. 
To be sure, juridical institutions are more faithful than the political ones to the Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, as the decision of the EU Court of Justice (ECJ) to reject inter 
alia the Italian law (Berlusconi government) that introduced the crime of illegal entry 
demonstrates. This decision reveals that there is a disjuncture between the Europe of rights 
and the Europe of politics, and thus an opportunity for the paradigm of supranational 
citizenship to resist the attack of nationalism. It is impossible to tell whether this juridical 
skirmish over the interpretation of basic rights in single cases will have an impact on the 
politics of immigration when migration is a mass phenomenon as at present. But in spite of 
what Europe wants or does not want, in one way or another, migrants are now part of its 
identity, of what it is and will be.3 They are the testing ground for the European project of 
transforming “the ideal of cosmopolitan citizenship into a reality” (Preuss 1998a, p. 149).
In this paper I shall try to unpack the nest of issues that migrations bring to the floor and show 
how immigration plays a crucial role in the making or unmaking democratic citizenship in 
post-national Europe. I will first illustrate the nucleus of principles and ideals that European 
citizenship embodies – in particular the right to free movement – and then introduce the 
category of statelessness which I propose in the last section of the paper to tackle the legal 
and political evolution furthered by the practice of rights and the ideal of a European post-
national citizenship. I interpret this challenge and the opportunities it may open in the 
3  The restrictions on immigration and even asylum have actually impacted the decision by national courts and EU 
court, which align with the anti-immigration nationalistic discourse dominating national publics; see Ayten Gündoğdu 
2014, pp. 107-125. 
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spirit of Hannah Arendt’s intuition that citizenship brings to the floor an unsolvable paradox 
between the human and the political. The conclusion of the paper argues that stateless 
people – the migrants – personify this paradox as they can be the locus of a new political 
practice that signals an incipient form of citizenship, truly disconnected from the nation 
as the European citizenship aspires to be. The denial of many civil and political rights to 
undocumented immigrants and the detention of thousands of migrants in the camps located 
at the peripheries of Europe contrast radically with the community of rights that Europe has 
sought to be since its inception.
The European Union was born on the freedom of movement and with an economic ambiguity 
that did not disappear, not even when with the Lisbon Treaty EU citizenship was entrenched 
by a family of rights built around “free movement” and “non-discrimination” between and 
across EU member States (Isin and Saward 2013, p.1). The Treaty of Rome established “Free 
Movement of Persons Provisions” and created a de facto embryonic supranational citizenship 
that was then formally instituted by the Treaty of the European Union in 1993. This last Treaty 
related the freedom of movement both to labor, in order to facilitate the mobility of workers 
within the Union, and to citizenship, which was given a clearly supranational identity and 
made “derivative” of that of the member States. The Lisbon Treaty, finally, defined European 
citizenship as “additional” to that of the member States thus making a further step toward 
dissociating it from national belonging and attaching it to the individual person. Quite 
appropriately, Engin F. Isin and Michael Saward render this last formulation as “enacting 
European citizenship” or associating citizenship not with membership or being (part of a 
nation-State) but public acting instead, “to acts of citizenship: claims to multiple legal and 
political forms of access to rights, or recognition, made by a myriad of actors, be they formal 
EU citizens or not” (Isin and Saward 2013, p.2).
So conceived, citizenship is primed to open unexpected possibilities for legal inclusion, 
beyond the strictures of national identity and State territoriality. To anticipate the sense 
of my argument, this activity-based formulation of citizenship is somewhat sensitive to the 
condition of the refugees “precisely because they are citizens of nowhere” and in this sense 
“potential citizens of the world” (Hassner 1998, p. 274). We may thus say that situating the 
freedom of movement at the core of European citizenship was revolutionary, the child of a 
modern ideal of liberty and peaceful cosmopolitan order. This ideal relies on a philosophy 
of human nature that is based on individual freedom as the condition for responsible and 
responsive behavior, and thus the construction of a legal order centered on the liberty of the 
person, equality before the law, and independence, as in Kant’s formulation. The Treaty of 
Rome acknowledged that migration is a “basic fact of human life which reflects the quest of 
individuals and collectivities to improve their life condition” (Preuss 1998b, p. 316).
Historically, the right to exit, or the right to freely move from, has been made synonymous 
with individual freedom and limited government (dictatorial regimes commonly follow 
up on successful coups by closing their borders and revoking passports). The correlation 
between regime form and free movement was achieved when rights were conceptualized and 
gradually engrafted into States’ constitutions. Thus the right to movement became equated 
with individual freedom. Beginning with the eighteenth century, the free circulation of goods, 
wealth, and labor within a country and between countries was equated with a quasi-utopian 
freedom because commerce would replace conquest, and free exchange imperial occupation 
and exploitation. In Adam Smith’s footsteps, Kant made almost an eulogy of movement and 
contrasted human beings’ ability to live everywhere with other creatures’ confinement within 
ecological niches. In his mind, the very form of the globe seemed to match with human’s 
propensity for motion and the ability to make even lifeless, impervious, and empty spaces, like 
1. 





the ocean or the desert, into expedients for communication (Kant 1795/1991, pp. 107-115). 
In Kant’s view, movement was naturally related to humans’ anthropological need for 
commercium, a word that in his rendering denoted something more and richer than economic 
exchange. It denoted in fact the mental disposition human beings have to meet new challenges 
and advance in experience and knowledge. It was thus the human condition itself that 
required and, in one way or another, created political and legal orders that were congenial 
to it. Constitutional republican government represented the moral and legal recognition 
of free movement and stood opposite to despotic regimes, which, in Montesquieu’s lucid 
conceptualization, engendered stagnation, and immobility – thus poverty due to lack of 
communication. Even in contemporary experience, dictatorial regimes that revoke passports 
and close borders are associated with economic distress and stagnation rather than commerce 
and prosperity (Sen 1999). 
Yet freedom of movement is a composite kind of freedom. It presumes direction toward 
somewhere and is associated with some ends or goals to be achieved through it, so as to 
acquire the character of means (Bader 2005). Moreover, movement occurs within space and 
implies borders of some kind, physical or symbolic, theoretical or existential, legal or material. 
Thus, although historically it had a quasi-utopian meaning, freedom of movement was always 
correlated with limits. One might say that this character is common of all rights, which are in 
a relation of reciprocal correlation with obligations and duties. Yet freedom of movement has 
some peculiarities of its own that make it difficult to theorize with “no restriction” (Carens 
1987/1995, p. 237)4. 
On some important occasions, the complexity of this right translates into an asymmetry 
between the right to exit and the right to enter so that whereas forbidding exit to citizens is a 
sign of tyranny, forbidding entry to foreigners has never been so stigmatized.5 The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights translated the asymmetry into norms: Article 13 declares that 
“Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each 
State” and that “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to 
return to his country”. Freedom of movement within one’s State, right to exit from it and right 
to return to it – this specificity exemplifies the asymmetrical character of the basic freedom 
of movement. Kant’s cosmopolitan right to visitation, or the duty we have not to treat one 
another with hostility simply because we look different, presumes not only that commercium 
is part of our anthropological nature, but also that we have as moral beings something to 
preserve, and our language or the several particular characteristics we carry with us when we 
travel or move are precisely part of our individual identity the cosmopolitan right to visitation 
is meant to protect.
The cosmopolitan right to hospitality is an exquisite individual and civil right that presumes 
our vulnerability and the fact that we are not undifferentiated beings but “this” or “that” 
human being; moreover, it presumes that there are in the globe many norms and legal and 
customary orders. The tension between the inhabitants of the world reflects the asocial 
sociability that Kant’s philosophy postulates, a condition that militates against cultural 
purism but also against individual isolationism and solipsism. As Jeremy Waldron has acutely 
observed, “the cosmopolitan right” has little to do with the potential for a world federation 
(which is instead the domain of “the right of nations”); it is an exquisite individual right that 
4  See also Carens’ more recent book (2013) dedicated to the theory of open borders.
5  “In ancient Greece, the Delphic priest regarded the right of unrestricted movement as one of the four freedoms 
distinguishing liberty and slavery. Ceremonies held to free slaves ritualistically proclaimed that the slave could 
now ‘run away to whomsoever he may wish’. And the major restraint that Sparta placed on its half-free Helots was 
depriving them of the right to move elsewhere” (Dowty, 1987, pp. 11-12).
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presumes a worldview that is “entirely pragmatic concerning the likely effects on freedom 
of various juridical arrangements[…].The circumstantial propositions about the peoples of 
the world living side-by-side within a determinate and spherical space, of their being unable 
to flee decisively from contact with one another, not to mention the prevalence of human 
curiosity and the urge to discover – all this means that even for a proponent of cultural 
integrity, isolation would be a lost cause” (Waldron 2006, pp. 89 and 91).
All this together allows us to appreciate the importance of making of the right to movement 
into the first citizen right that the European States recognize. It was a right not only to exit 
but also to enter: this is the revolutionary implication of The Treaty of Rome, which was thus 
oriented toward cooperation among States in order to create a legal space in which the right 
to movement could be finally symmetrical, thus a perfect right. The EU started as a legal order 
agreement that lifted internal barriers and allowed a mixing of nationalities. It prepared the 
terrain for further dissociation of individual rights from the nation-State as the unique agent 
of rights protection. Beyond the nation-State, a legal order was put into being that would host 
and protect all the European citizens, even against their own State if needed. The Treaty of 
Rome resulted thus more than in opening the door to a decoupling of citizenship from the 
nation; moreover it made State borders themselves open.
The European Union was born on the freedom of movement and with an explicit assumption 
in Kantian terms: people tend to move, interact and communicate for reasons that are their 
own, with the consequence that this indirect process of systematic public relations would 
eventually engender the need of a more perfect political union. The open space that European 
citizens were to occupy by travelling, resettling, and directly communicating was primed to 
form a new mentality and in this sense a European spirit, the first nucleus of the cosmopolitan 
spirit that Kant envisaged. “To consider oneself, according to internal civil law, as an associate 
member of a cosmopolitan society is the most sublime idea a man can have of his destination” 
as he can feel at home in the world.6 European citizenship was inspired by this philosophy, 
which oriented the behavior of each State both toward its citizens, the other States, and all 
individuals (Hassner 1998, p. 285). 
Hence, although the freedom of movement at the European level was firstly conceived 
according to the State members’ economic concerns, it evolved toward the construction 
of a political citizenship made of a constellation of civil and political rights attached to the 
individual and not derived by an European demos. In spite of the active role played by the 
States, “over the course of the unification process the balance has shifted dramatically within 
the organizational structure in favor of the European citizens” (Habermas 2012, p. 31). Born 
in a non-democratic way and with primarily economic concerns, the legal and juridical 
structure developed later on by the Lisbon Treaty would give centrality to European citizens 
and conform “unequivocally to democratic principles” (Habermas 2012, p. 31). European 
citizenship appears to be constituted by a web of rights and legal constructs that satisfy 
the democratic principles without the subordination to the national level and without the 
reference to “the expression of self-determination of a sovereign European people” (Grimm 
2005, p. 96).
Certainly, the economic reasons for the right to movement and the role of the member States 
never disappeared. They were, however, never so preponderant to obstruct the formulation 
of decisions concerning the citizenship of the EU that were able to make it a formal legal 
status (the Maastricht Treaty of 1993) to be incrementally increased by the subsequent 
treaties of Amsterdam (1999), Nice (2003) and Lisbon (2009). Although it is hard to define the 
6  Kant’s citation quoted in Hassner 1998, pp. 285-286. See also Daniele Archibugi 2008, pp. 114-119.
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institutional identity of EU, it is certain that its commitment to the centrality of citizenship 
projects it beyond an economic community. The central themes of the “constitutional treaty” 
of Lisbon are “human rights, democracy, the rule of law, welfare provision or solidarity, and 
the enhancement of culture” (Grimm 2005, p. 99). If asked to synthetize in a sentence the 
character of this construction, one could say that EU embodies in its genesis the reason of 
its existence, that of making the European countries interdependent economically in order 
to make Europe an open space for their citizens and thus become a peaceful and cooperative 
environment subjected to a constitutional politics that grew without a direct plan or the will 
of some body. In this Kantian movement from war to a perpetual peace, from national to 
cosmopolitan, the beginning of the history of European Union was encapsulated. 
This is the perspective that leads Jürgen Habermas in his The Crisis of The European Union: 
A Response to depict the philosophical move from the national to the supranational and to 
the cosmopolitan forms in which law and politics are coupled together in Europe in a work 
of progressive subjection of power to right and law. The eighteenth century invisible hand 
logic makes sense of the argument that wants European citizenship not to have a monadic 
foundational source. The nationalist and populist accusation moved against the EU not to 
be democratic because it lacks a founding “we the people” is, Habermas wrote recently, the 
remnant of nineteenth century constitutionalism, which grounded its political legitimacy 
on a pre-legal and heteronomous entity like the nation. Equally wrong is the accusation that 
economic interest is the inner motor of the EU and the Community of Citizens is a myth 
covering the reality of a market without a State. For both readings, the economic reason 
contained in the original right to free movement remained de facto the only substantive 
reason keeping together the continental space. Against these mirror-like interpretations, 
Habermas has recently proposed a return to Kant and invoked a legitimacy principle superior 
to the nation and to any other heterogeneous reason, like the economy, while is based on 
the progress of political relations from violence and the arbitrary use of power toward a 
constitutionalized politics open to justification and the citizens’ quest for accountability 
(Habermas 2012, p. 7). Within Habermas’ reading, thus, the “executive federalism” that 
developed since 2008 is a sign of a return to the past, with the centrality of plenipotentiaries 
meetings behind closed doors seeking decisions that have to satisfy first of all sectarian 
interests, be them nationalistic or financial.
The question we should ask is whether the Kantian paradigm is sufficient in a moment in 
which the process of unification comes to a standstill. Whether the Kantian paradigm was a 
successful strategy in starting the process of European integration because of its ability to 
deflate the role of political will and make agreements feel the outcome of a voluntary decisions 
by equal partners, today a return to Kant seems toothless. The challenges facing European 
citizenships would require a political determination in Altiero Spinelli’s spirit more than Jean 
Monnet’s and Robert Schuman’s. As a matter of fact, Kant’s paradigm is itself very demanding 
and far from self-processing as peace is more demanding than the mere absence of war 
(Isiksel, forthcoming). 
Furthermore, the paradox of the eighteenth century paradigm of indirectness and political 
will deflation can explain both the civilized function of the constitutionalized politics that the 
legal practices of the EU have created through the years and the “executive federalism” that 
the practice of a market without a State has engendered in later years of economic crisis. Both 
of these results are possible within the indirect process toward a transnational interaction 
and a kind of interdependence that is activated by the logic of unintended consequences 
and the invisible hand of doux commerce. It is not implied in this paradigm that its indirect 
process is able to lead the European Union toward a more democratic integration. And it is 
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written nowhere that the cosmopolitan spirit of hospitality will consolidate by force of legal 
habit if the latter’s implementation is left to the member States as it happens now. Both the 
political evolution of the European Union beyond economic interdependence and the political 
evolution of European citizenship need to be politically desired, promoted, and implemented. 
“Having been excluded from the decisions that shaped ever-closer union, European publics 
are now consenting to the arrogance of technocracy by professing dismissive euroskepticism, 
resentful populism, and virulent xenophobia” (Isiksel, forthcoming). The problem with the 
eighteenth century paradigm of a civilization achieved without the need (and the risk) of 
mobilizing the political will is that it is unable to offer valid reasons for why the EU should 
proceed further in its integration and why European citizenship should become more inclusive 
and not simply arbitrarily hospitable towards the masses of refugees pressing at its door and 
the immigrants residing in its territory. 
The difficult balance within the right to free movement between political prospects and 
economic interests, what I have been defining as its original ambiguity, finds confirmation 
in the shift from the construction of supranational citizenship to the protection of national 
and economic interests in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008 and mass migration. 
Intergovernmental practices and nationalist closure of borders are dramatic implications 
of that shift and a threat against European citizenship as well. Immigration, and moreover 
mass migration, challenges the vision of transnational citizenship as a spontaneous or self-
incremental process and brings to the floor the need for political institutions at the European 
level that are able both to overcome the practice of “executive federalism” and to reinforce 
European citizenship. 
Let us return to the issue of the ambiguity of civil and political rights in the name of interests, 
national or economic, that the Treaty of Rome contained and that intensified with the growth 
of immigration and the deepening of the economic crisis. At the beginning of the European 
process of unification, that ambiguity applied essentially to internal immigration (the early 
concern in 1950s and 1960s). Subsequently, it applied to extra-communitarian migration by 
shaping both the politics of integration with legal immigrants (referred to as ‘third-country 
nationals’) and that of repression with paperless migrants. Some scholars have thus argued 
that “EU Citizenship amounts to little more than a cynical public relations exercise, and that 
even the most substantive right (to free movement and residence) is not granted according to 
an individual’s status as a citizen ‘but in their capacity as factors of production” (Weiler 1998, 
p. 13; see also Ackers and Dwyer 2004, p. 457). If the basic right of freedom of movement is so 
directly connected to economic reasons—the circulation of a competitive labor force—this 
means that national boundaries are interpreted and used as mechanisms functional to an 
international division of labor. They become the loci of the conflict between opposite interests 
because while foreign workers undermine a nation’s working class when the hosting State 
allows them to be less socially protected than its national working class, they meet with the 
interests of those economic sectors whose competitiveness relies on cheap labor (Sassen 1988, 
pp. 36-37). 
This conflict is at the core of what James Hollifiel has called the “liberal paradox,” that fact 
that a democratic society based on an open market and freedom of movement maintains 
a degree of legal closure in order to shelter the social contract between labor and capital, 
thus acknowledging that its welfare state presupposes a closed and uniform society. 
Strategies of legal closure are not necessarily brutally direct (blocking borders, incarcerating 
and repatriating illegal immigrants). In fact, they are mostly indirect, particularly when 
addressed toward legal immigrants, for instance limiting their civil and social rights, making 









(Hollifield et al. 2014, pp. 4-6). In sum, for European States, and now also the European Union, 
regaining control over their borders amounts to admitting that “immigration control may 
require a rollback of civil and human rights for noncitizens” (Hollifield et al. 2014, p. 9). 
In this sense, immigration is the crucible of European citizenship as the field of tradeoffs 
between rights and labor: “States can have more foreign workers with fewer rights, or they 
can have fewer foreign workers with more rights, but they cannot have both numbers (open 
labor market) and rights” (idem). Hence, the question of migration is not merely one of border 
security or economics; it is not even a question confined within the right of movement as it 
could be in the case of the citizens belonging to Europe’s member States. It is broadly and 
directly an issue that pertains to the configuration of citizenship and the identity of European 
Union, whose destiny is mirrored in the way the EU relates to migrants now and in the future. 
Indeed the economic crisis has deepened the trade-off between rights and interests in many 
European countries and, regardless of the ideological coalition in power in the member 
States, the politics of immigration that have been adopted are a blatant violation of the values 
associated with the community of citizens Europe aspires to be, democratic principles, the rule 
of law, the right to petition, both with the long-term resident immigrants (it is a general trend 
in European States the restriction of the naturalization politics and the curtailing of civil and 
social rights to third-country nationals) and with the paperless migrants as several European 
countries have made it harder for refugees to enjoy the right of asylum (see the German 
revision of art. 18 of the Constitution) and easier for national governments to adopt detention 
and repatriation as security policies or border protection policies.7 
A nationally based solution to migration amounts to two main policies: crude strategies of 
expulsion and incarceration of paperless immigrants, and the selection of the preferred 
immigrants who better fit the economic needs of the national community. Faster visa and 
residential policies are used today by several European States as strategies to cope with their 
shortage of a labor force with specific skills and age and also to lower the social rights to 
European workers. “These policies, by all means, have taken the form of a race for the fittest, 
a ‘battle for gains and brains’, with nationally different regulations” (van Houtum and Pijpers, 
2015).8 Thus, restriction of asylum, difficulty of integration, detention in the host centers 
located at the border of Europe and in airports and finally expulsion are the strategies that 
qualify European citizenship as a new form of national citizenship rather than a supranational 
or even cosmopolitan citizenship, as envisaged in the idealized view of the Lisbon Treaty. 
At the core of this European nationalist politics of borders lies the disconnect of human 
right from civil and political rights, of the individual and the citizen, a contradiction with 
the Lisbon Treaty which, as said above, although States that the citizenship of the Union is 
complementary and does not replace national citizenship, ascribes to the former a number 
of rights and duties in “addition” to those stemming from citizenship of a State member. It 
ascribes to EU citizens who reside in a member State of which they are not nationals the right 
to vote and to stand as candidates at local elections and in the elections for the European 
Parliament. Moreover it gives them the right to diplomatic protection by any State member 
7  Detention and deportation were and are used as exceptional measures in time of emergency to confine suspected 
terrorists or “enemy aliens” but since 1990s detention “has been normalized as a legitimate tool used by states in 
immigration control”; in Europe from 2000 to 2012 the number of camps for immigration detention “has increased 
from 324 to 473” (Gündoğdu 2014, pp. 116-127).
8  A related policy has been that of making a “civic stratification” that is to say of disarticulating the status of 
immigration in order to make it more manageable by the hosting countries, not in order to protect more effectively 
the rights of the immigrants; thus differentiation and hierarchy had been made in relation to employment, asylum, 
job seeking, residence seeking, family reunification, naturalization (see Lydia Morris, 2002).
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and the right to petition the European Parliament. As Ulrick Preuss has written, “nationals 
of third countries are excluded, and the list associated with it [European citizenship] are 
quite short,” yet “to be a citizen of a supranational entity is a major innovation,” insofar as 
it is contrary to the traditional nation-State framework. In this sense, “European citizenship 
could even be conferred on individuals who do not possess the nationality of any of the 
member States. European citizenship would open the symbolic space for social activities which 
finally could lead to a European societas civilis sive politica” (Preuss 1998a, pp. 139 and 148). To 
rephrase Isin and Saward’s above mentioned interpretation, the Lisbon Treaty’s formulation 
proposes “enacting European citizenship” as it associates citizenship with action which gives 
individuals the rights to make claims to multiple legal and political forms of access to rights, 
which means to be recognized by a myriad of actors, “be they formal EU citizens or not.” To 
paraphrase Arendt, it enacts the “right to have rights.”
In the aftermath of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Hannah Arendt wrote: “Recent 
attempts to frame a new bill of human rights have demonstrated that no one seems able to 
define with any assurance what these general human rights, as distinguished from the rights 
of citizens, really are” (Arendt 1949, p. 26). A divorce between human rights and political 
rights makes both human rights and democracy devoid of the possibility of contestation and 
actions in public which democracy entails rights, individual and civil or in current sense 
“human”.9 This divorce would be as questionable as that between liberalism and democracy 
because if democracy requires an open discussion in order for the citizens to develop opinions 
and views upon which they can exercise their freedom of choice this means that democracy 
implies individual rights in their fullest. Political rights cannot exist or being practiced 
without each individual being free to form, express and change her views, without the right to 
a voice that is public and expressed in public. The idea of European citizenship contains this 
principle when, first it keeps basic rights and political rights tied and second, in order to better 
actualize their tie, it dissociates citizenship from national belonging. 
Within this normative context, citizenship becomes a fully political and legal condition. In this 
rendering, the autonomy of the legal order from the nation is claimed. To go back to the issue 
with which this article began, the State imposes its power (coercive and protective at once) 
on all the inhabitants living in its territory – citizens and non-citizens – but the nation links 
rights to birth (a natural fact) and thus excludes. The State includes all under its power while 
the nation wants the State for itself. Arendt thought that no institution, whether national or 
supranational or international, was free of this aporia, which was the reason why she shared in 
the traditions of those theorists who excluded the possibility of a global political government. 
She recognized that a federal organization of sovereignty allows for more secure human 
rights because of its detachment of the State from the nation, but did not fantasize of a global 
federation that would solve this conundrum. Retaining the tension was her answer, which 
entailed reading the original formulation of the “declaration of the rights of man and the 
citizen” as a fortunate indeterminacy, the sign of openness and contestation of all attempts to 
sever the two (Arendt 1946, pp. 138-141).
Stripping “man” of belonging to a legal order, that is to say interrupting its relation to the 
“citizen” would entail two outcomes equally frightening in Arendt’s mind: opening the 
door to the possibility of statelessness and subsuming the implementation of human rights 
under Samaritan morality. The former eventuality would translate into sheer domination 
and the latter would become a system of infantilization; both conditions would make the 









recipients of human rights a dependent subject, a non-person. Statelessness thus translates 
into rightlessness. In the twentieth century Germany and part of continental Europe, ethnic 
cleansing was realized after reducing (and by reducing) the Jews and the members of other 
national minorities, like the Roma, to the status of non-citizens in the country where they 
were born or resided and enjoyed full citizenship right, with the ensuing well-known outcome 
that they could be deported and eliminated en masse.
Political rights, those tragic events prove, are not superimposed or separable from human 
rights insofar as the latter are ineffectual without the legal protection of the State. A stateless 
person is at the mercy of the potentate of the moment. One might object that to be under 
a tyrannical State is not after all better condition that being stateless. Yet living under a 
tyrannical regime and being subjected to its arbitrary will do not translate into a legal non-
existence. To be subjected to a tyrant can translate into conspiring against him and fighting 
for political and civil liberty: political agency is affirmed, proclaimed and actualized even at 
cost of life and imprisonment. But to be subjected to no State, to be a subject to a nowhere 
legal place of sort, entails not having any voice or any political agency.10 Against whom can 
a legally non-existing individual mobilize, create an opposition opinion, join a resistance 
movement, revolt and change the regime, or simply contest, voice her claims, and petition? 
Thus a tyrannical State is a better condition than no State at all. In this sense, Arendt wrote 
that statelessness is fatally connected to rightlessness.
As legal personhood is an identity that is associated with political voice, its absence equals 
deprivation of a vindication agency. This is the condition that is underlined today in the 
phenomenon of mass migration, which involves not isolated immigrants as individuals 
who decide to leave their country of origins, but masses of people who are recognized as 
statelessness by world opinion. They are stateless for various reasons: because the State they 
come from has ceased to exist due to wars or civil wars, or are fugitives who have to keep 
their identity secret to eschew the consequences of repression due to their religious creed, 
gender, or ethnic identity. Statelessness refers thus to the condition whereby an individual 
is not considered as a national by any State under the operations of its law and is, therefore, 
not entitled to any right or privileges enjoyed by the nationals. The international community 
has recognized the gravity of this problem after World War II and committed to overcome the 
stateless condition.
The UN refugee agency was born out of World War II in order to help the millions of Europeans 
displaced by the conflict to return home and regain their legal and political status. The Office 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was established on December 1950 
by the United Nations General Assembly with a three-year mandate to complete its work 
and then disband. Its plan to have a short life bespoke the identification of displacement and 
statelessness as an emergency and thus a temporary condition. By 1951, the United Nations 
Convention started another program on the Status of Refugees and in 1954 adopted the 
Convention on stateless people and gave itself the mission of helping people to overcome their 
statelessness condition. In 1961 many countries signed the convention, pledging to assure a 
nationality to stateless people born on their territory and to favor naturalization and political 
integration. 
UNHCR became more and more important and active during the succeeding years, coinciding 
with several new waves of emergency: refugees from countries of the Eastern bloc; refugees 
from the decolonization wars in Africa; from displacement crises in Asia, Latin America; 
10  See the excellent analysis of Arendt’s idea of statelessness as rightlessness by Gündoğdu (Gündoğdu 2014, ch. 4 and 
5). 
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from the wars in the Balkans and Africa; from the recent revolutions in North Africa and the 
civil war in Syria. According to a survey released on March 2014, statelessness affected more 
than 10 million people worldwide and leaves them with no identity. While human rights are 
conceived as in principle universal and inborn, a large range of fundamental human rights are 
in practice denied to stateless people thereby making their lives more unbearable and at the 
mercy of those who succor them.11 Without political rights no rights are enjoyed, although 
human rights are ascribed to persons as if they were flowed from their natural existence. 
For reason of war, persecution of religion, ethnic and gender problems, famine and 
destitution, countries in all continents have produced an unforeseeable increase of migrants, 
refugees who flee hunger and violence, and ask for asylum. Yet stateless and displaced people 
are only in small proportion refugees and asylum seekers. Mostly they are irregular migrants, 
without the requisite documentation for expatriation or for being accepted in the host 
country, and use unauthorized border-crossing points. More frequently, they are victims of 
smugglers. 
In both countries of asylum and countries of origin, the UNHCR works within national 
political, economic, and social structures that directly affect the lives of refugees and other 
people of concern to bring policies, practices and laws into compliance with international 
standards. In situations of forced displacement, the UNHCR employs advocacy to influence 
governments and other decision-makers, non-governmental partners and the public at large 
to adopt practices ensuring the protection of those of concern to UNHCR. Article 2 of the 
Statute of the Office of the UNHCR declares that countries should be “admitting refugees to 
their territories, not excluding those in the most destitute categories” and asks the States 
to assist the High Commissioner “in his efforts to promote the voluntary repatriation of 
refugees” or in “promoting the assimilation of refugees, especially by facilitating their 
naturalization”. Thus, although UNHCR is humanitarian and not political by statute, it holds 
statelessness is a political issue because it is a condition to be overcome in a way that is 
“consistent with human rights”, thus either by making possible inclusion and naturalization 
in the host country or by promoting their “voluntary” repatriation. Neither detention nor 
enforced repatriation are considered an option because they are in flagrant violation of human 
rights. 
The destiny of migrants must thus be settled and not by any kind of settlement but by a 
legally recognized one, with rights protected by a legal order – which is in fact a form of, 
or an accompaniment to naturalization. This amounts to acknowledging that citizenship 
is the necessary condition for making the enjoyment of human rights certain (as a matter 
of fact, UNHCR operates in those situations in which the disassociation of human rights 
and citizenship exists). Given the deeply political nature of the phenomena associated with 
immigration and migration, for the EU to be societas civilis sive politica the juristic power of the 
Court is not enough, because while the Court discusses and resolves individual cases, these 
mass phenomena ask for political decisions. 
The decision to extend the rights associated to European citizens to residents of European 
territory who are not citizens and to extend civil right to migrants is exquisitely political and 
calls upon the EU to be made, not solely the member States. These decisions are consistent 
11  Mr. Mitt cited their inability to have national identity documents, vote, register marriage or children, own 
property, have access health care and being blocked from obtaining employment as some of the challenges stateless 
people faced worldwide. According to the report, statelessness in West Africa occurred for a variety of reasons, 
including discrimination against specific groups in a country, discrepancies in nationality laws, and administrative 




with the origin of the European droit de cité as it developed from the right of entry and 
residence – it was a right for and of immigrants. As a right tied to immigration, its operational 
implementation has to be able to take into account “the diversity of collective situations and 
individual trajectories covered by this term” (Balibar 2004, p. 47). Whereas at the time of the 
Treaty of Rome, the citizens of European States were the immigrants that the right of entry 
and residence intended to protect, immigrants of non-European origins living and working 
in the European States or undocumented migrants in the detention camps are the new 
immigrants, are the phenomena whose conditions the European rights should be adapted to. 
Ėtienne Balibar proposed to overcome a strict definition of these rights by including the right 
of paperless migrants in the detention camps to petition and to address their representative 
claims toward the European Union as well as the rights of resident immigrants to full political 
rights (Babilar 2004, pp. 46-50).12 The right to movement must be endowed with the right to 
voice, as the very UNHCR charter suggests.
The novelty in these last years, starting from the revolt in Greece in December 2008, is that 
migrants have shown a willingness to use a political language, to exercise some form of 
citizenship, putting in practice what the European myth has being preaching. It happened 
at Rosarno, in Italy, at the beginning of 2010, when the African seasonal workers organized 
themselves in order to react against their half-slavery. It happened outside of Europe, in 
Australia, where in a detention camp more than three hundred migrants decided to hold a 
hunger strike in order to speak to authorized officials of the Australian government and have 
their request accepted not to be repatriated to Afghanistan, from where they had fled; they 
asked for interlocutors with bargaining authority, just as we citizens do when we want to 
have our voice heard. But to us that voice is given by the Constitution of our States and the 
European several conventions and treaties. To them it is denied in spite of the human rights 
they are supposed to enjoy.
In all these cases, although in different circumstances, migrants have voiced a clear self-
proclamation of political subjectivity, an important step because an explicit vindication of 
human rights alone does not give the power to oppose what is to be expected from their status 
as refugees, i.e. repatriation. Not to be repatriated is a request originating from having not 
only human rights, but also political voice. In these cases as in several others in European 
countries, immigrants and migrants act as if they were citizens and in doing so they make a 
request for political rights as human beings – they claim a supranational and cosmopolitan 
citizenship. This is the novelty that is emerging from the recent movements of stateless 
migrants. It is an important challenge to Europe’s progressive and democratic ambitions, 
because the reasonable necessity of regulating migratory flows must no doubt be coupled with 
a project that endows migrants the dignity of political agency, as a power to make proposals 
and raise objections, to bargain and have the claims represented, thus situating themselves 
beyond and independently of their belonging to a nation-State. Their claims are consistent 
with the ideal of a cosmopolitan community to which European citizenship belongs as an 
institutional framework of which “the ‘citizens’ and the ‘people’ are the constitutive founding 
subjects” (Habermas 2012, p. 54).
12  This half-citizenship is however deeply disturbing, although its proposal can be moved by good intentions. A 
precedent of this half-citizenship is to be found in the ancient Roman republic, which adopted a resolution known as 
civitas sine suffragio with its Latin socii; this semi-citizenship did not include the right to vote but included some civil 
rights that only Roman citizens enjoyed, like economic transaction and the rule of law. As second class citizens, their 
condition did not actually entail a temporary status or transition toward full citizenship; at any rate, the decision on 
their destiny was wholly in the hand of the Roman citizens who had a discretionary power over them as over all other 
subjects without rights. See Mouritsen 2007; for a recent re-evaluation of civitas sine suffraggio see Pettit 1997, pp. 27-28.
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